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We analyse the system of nonmonotonic logic invented by McCain and
Turner, which is usually referred to as “causal reasoning”. We argue the
following: that the McCain-Turner system can be perspicuously reformu-
lated as a modal logic; that, so reformulated, it is best regarded as a logic
of explanation rather than of causality; and, finally, that this logic of ex-
planation has illuminating connections with a logic of argument due to
Parsons and Jennings.
In the course of our argument, we give a sequent calculus formulation
of McCain and Turner’s logic, and show that it satisfies cut elimination.
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1 Motivation
This paper will start from a theme which is a little removed from the main-
stream of formal logic, namely from the discussion, in the Artificial Intelligence
community, of the so-called “frame problem”: this is the problem of reasoning,
using logic, about action and change. Although this discussion has generated
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a considerable quantity of theory, we will discuss here a single approach: the
system invented by McCain and Turner, and which is usually referred to as
“causal reasoning”.
1.1 The McCain-Turner System
The [7] treatment of the frame problem goes, roughly, as follows. They start with
a binary sentential operator: let us write it · . ·. Applications of this operator
– of the form φ . ψ – are called “causal rules”, and they can, in McCain and
Turner’s treatment, be regarded as purely metatheoretic assertions. A collection
of causal rules will be called a causal theory. Given a language L and a causal
theory Ξ, we define an operator (·)Ξ, from models to sets of sentences, as follows:
MΞ = {ψ|φ . ψ ∈ D,M  φ}. (1)
We now say that a model M of L is causally explained iff it is the only model
of MΞ. And we say that a proposition P is a consequence of Ξ iff it is true in
all of the Ξ-causally explained models of L. Given suitably chosen causal rules,
this procedure appears to work: that is, it yields correct solutions of the frame
problem, and it is fairly efficient computationally.
1.2 The Road Ahead
As it stands, though, this definition is not entirely perspicuous, either mathe-
matically or conceptually. The definition of causally explained models is myste-
rious: we would, thus, like a more illuminating treatment of the mathematics.
Furthermore, it is difficult to explain the conceptual role of .. For example, one
of McCain and Turner’s standard causal rules is of the form
φ(t) ∧ φ(t+ 1) . φ(t+ 1), (2)
where φ(t) means that φ holds at time t. But reading . as ‘causes’ here is simply
implausible: propositions – or the states of affairs which they denote – are not
usually thought of as causing themselves.
So, we will do two things in this paper. Firstly, we will give an alternative
definition of (1): it can easily be reformulated as a relation between models, and
relations on a set of models give modal operators. So we can, instead, define
a suitable modal operator, @; given this operator, the deductive closure of (1)
turns out to be
{P |M  @P}, (3)
and the relation
φ ` @ψ.
is equivalent to φ . ψ (equivalent in the sense that the two relations give the
same set of explanatorily closed models).
But, as well as merely technical reformulations, we also want to say what
these constructions mean. We argue, then, that a better reading of φ.ψ is that
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‘φ explains ψ’ – and, correspondingly, @ψ can be regarded as a disjunction of
all of the possible explanations of ψ. In fact, this explanatory reading has been
anticipated: Lifschitz paraphrases φ.ψ as “[ψ] has a cause if [φ] is true, or . . . [φ]
provides a ‘causal explanation’ for [ψ]” [4, p. 451]. And, given this explanatory
reading, rules such as (2) seem far less contentious: (2) simply says that a good
explanation for φ being true at t + 1 is that it was true at t and has the same
truth values at t and t + 1. Furthermore this reading naturally allows certain
facts to “explain themselves”, something which is quite usual in McCain-Turner
style formalisms. Self-explanation is a good deal less problematic than self-
causation, since explanations, after all, have to come to an end (or, of course,
loop) at some point – see, for example [17, §217].
And we can go further than this. McCain and Turner’s theory seems, from
this perspective, to be a very natural formulation of explanation in general :
although its original application may have been to a causal context, there is
nothing about it which forces these explanations to be causal. Once we broaden
our horizons to general explanation, we can bring this modal system into contact
with other work: for example, [8] (see also [9]) have a natural deduction system
for formalising arguments, which system is a fragment of ours. And, where we
have explanations, questions must also be in the neighbourhood: and thus we
could also express a good deal of the formalism of [1] (see [3]) in terms of ours.
2 The Modal Logic
Our system will be given by a sequent calculus, as in [16]; it is given by the rules
in Table 1, whose formulation depends on an underlying set of causal rules. A
causal rule, here, is an ordered pair of propositions, written φ . ψ: φ and ψ are
allowed to have free variables, but, in a given causal rule, φ can have no more
free variables than ψ.
This modal theory, as we will show, captures the meaning of the McCain-
Turner causal implications, in the sense that a causal rule φ.ψ can be expressed
as φ ` @ψ. In this it is somewhat similar to the system of [15], but, unlike
Turner, we have a proof-theory with good properties.
We should remark that the rule for @L is, in general, infinitary (and even
when finite, its set of premises can well be undecidable). The qualification “in
general” is important here: typical applications will use sequents for which this
rule always has a finite, decidable (and, indeed, very tractable) set of premises.
Indeed, many applications will only use the right rule for @, which is much more
tractable. Furthermore, even when the rule is actually infinitary, the system is
still very useful for metatheoretical purposes: after all, the proof-theoretic use
of infinitary systems has a very long and respectable history (see, for example,
[2, p. 164]).
Remark 1. As it stands, the modal language extends the original language L
by the modal operator @: call the new language L@. However, cut elimination
will show that L@ is a definitional extension of L: indeed, if we were to assume
3
Table 1: Sequent Calculus Rules
Ax
A ` A L ⊥⊥`
Γ ` ∆
LW




Γ, A,A ` ∆
LC




Γ, A,B ` ∆ ∧L
Γ, A ∧B ` ∆
Γ ` A,∆ Γ ` B,∆ ∧R
Γ ` A ∧B,∆
Γ, A ` ∆ Γ, B ` ∆ ∨L
Γ, A ∨B ` ∆
Γ ` A,B,∆ ∨R
Γ ` A ∨B,∆
Γ ` A,∆ Γ, B ` ∆ → L
Γ, A→ B ` ∆
Γ, A ` B,∆ → R
Γ ` A→ B,∆
Γ, A[x/t] ` ∆ ∀L
Γ,∀xA ` ∆
Γ ` A[x/y],∆ ∀R
Γ ` ∀xA,∆
Γ, A[x/y] ` ∆ ∃L
Γ,∃xA ` ∆
Γ ` A[x/t],∆ ∃R
Γ ` ∃xA,∆
Γ ` φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn,∆ ψ1, . . . , ψn ` X @R
Γ ` @X,∆{




Γ ` Xm,∆ Γ′, Xn ` ∆′
multicut
Γ,Γ′ ` ∆,∆′
conditions on the rules:
∀R y not free in Γ or ∆, and either y = x or y not free in A
∃L y not free in Γ or ∆, and either y = x or y not free in A@R where, for all i, φi . ψi is an instantiation of a causal rule.@L for each appropriate i and j, we have an instantiation of a
causal rule φij .ψij , and where the {φij} and {ψij}, for i ∈ I
and, for each i, j = 1, . . . , ki, are the only such sets of φs and
ψs that there are
multicut Xn stands for n occurrences of X; m,n > 0
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that L has arbitrary disjunctions, we could write
@P = ∨
ψ1,...,ψk`P
φi ∧ . . . ∧ φk
So, L@ is rather closely tied to L: the following proposition gives an illumi-
nating characterisation of L@.
Proposition 1. In the presence of arbitrary disjunctions, @ is the minimal K
modality which satisfies
φ ` @ψ for all φ . ψ :
to be precise, suppose that L@′ is an extension of L by a modal operator @′, such
that
• L@′ has arbitrary disjunctions,
• there is an entailment relation `′ on L@′ ,
• relative to this entailment relation, @′ is a K modality, and
• for any φ . ψ, we have φ `′ @′ψ.
Then there is an interpretation α : L@ → L@′ , compatible with the entailment
relations, such that, for all P ∈ L@,
α(@P ) `′ @′α(P ).
Proof. Define α as follows. It is the identity on non-modal propositions, and its
effect on modalisations is given by
α(@P ) = ∨
ψ1,...,ψk`P
φ1 ∧ . . . φk
(the right hand side is clearly an element of L and so is in L@′); extend α truth-
functionally to the whole of L@. We now show that α is compatible with the
entailment relations: we do this by supposing that Γ ` ∆, and showing, by
induction on the proof tree, that α(Γ) `′ α(∆). This is clear for axioms, and
for the non-modal rules: we now consider the modal rules. For @R, this comes
down to showing that, if α(Γ) ` φ1 ∧ . . .∧φk, α(∆), and if ψ1, . . . , ψk ` P , then
α(Γ) ` α(@P ), α(∆); but this follows immediately from the definition of α(@P ).
The proof of the case for @L is similarly trivial.
Now we show that, for any P ∈ L@,
α(@P ) `′ @′α(P )
We apply the definition of α and the left rule for
∨
: we then have to prove
that, if ψ1, . . . , ψk ` P , that φ1, . . . , φk ` @′α(P ). But this follows from the
properties of K modalities and the assumptions made on @′.
After our cut elimination result, we can prove a version of Proposition 1
which does not rely on the existence of arbitrary disjunctions.
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2.1 Cut Elimination
Theorem 1. Given a McCain-Turner causal theory, the corresponding modal
system satisfies cut elimination.
Proof. (Cf. [16]) This is analogous to the theorem of [13]: however, because the
system is, in general, infinitary, proof trees may contain branches of unbounded
length, and we have to be careful about the induction we use.
The interesting case is when we have a cut of @R against @L, and where the
cutformulae are principal on both sides. We have:
Π···




Γ′, φi1 , . . . , φiki , (@X)n ` ∆′

i∈I @L
Γ′, (@X)n+1 ` ∆′
multicut
Γ,Γ′ ` ∆,∆′
We also suppose that m,n > 0; other cases are similar but simpler.
We first move the cut up on the left:
Π···
Γ ` φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φk, (@X)m∆

Πi···
Γ′φi1 , . . . , φiki , (@X)n ` ∆′

Γ′, (@X)n+1 ` ∆′
multicut
Γ,Γ′ ` φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φk,∆,∆′
Now the cut has been moved up on the left, and the cutformula is the same:
so we may inductively apply cut elimination to this proof, and obtain a cutfree
proof (call it P0) of its result.
We next note that the set φ1, . . . , φk on the left must correspond to one of
the sets φi1 , . . . , φiki on the right, so that we can move the cut up on the right:
Π···
Γ ` φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn, (@X)m,∆
Γ ` (@X)m+1,∆
Πi0···
Γ′, φ1, . . . , φk, (@X)n ` ∆
multicut
Γ,Γ′, φ1, . . . , φk ` ∆,∆′
for a suitable i0; again we have moved the cut up so we can, inductively, obtain
a cut free proof (call this P1) of its result.
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Finally we put these proofs together: we get
P0···
Γ,Γ′ ` φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φk,∆,∆′
P1···
Γ,Γ′, φ1, . . . , φk ` ∆,∆′··· ∧R
Γ,Γ′, φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φk ` ∆,∆′
multicut
(Γ)2, (Γ′)2 ` (∆)2, (∆′)2
LC,RC
Γ,Γ′ ` ∆,∆′
This cut has not been moved upwards, but the cutformula has been changed
from @X to φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φk; although the logical complexity may have increased,
the modal depth will (because of our restriction on the form of the causal rules)
have decreased.
This is the essential idea of the proof: however, because we have an infini-
tary system, we have to use the methods of ordinal analysis (see, for example,
Pohlers [11]) in order to carry out the induction.
So, trivially:
Corollary 1. The modal theory is a conservative extension of the non-modal
theory.
We also have our promised generalisation of Proposition 1. As in [10], we




Proposition 2. Suppose that L@′ is an extension of L by a modal operator @′,
and suppose that we have an entailment relation `′ on L@′ given by a sequent
calculus with the K rule, together with a set of axioms closed under substitution.
Suppose also that we have, for any φ . ψ,
φ `′ @′ψ
Then there is a conservative extension 〈L˜, ˜`〉 of 〈L@′ ,`′〉, and an interpretation
α of L@ in L˜, such that, for any P ∈ L@,
α(@P )˜` @′ (αP )
Proof. Extend 〈L@′ ,`′〉 to 〈L˜, ˜`〉 by adding another modality, @˜, together with
rules for @˜ of the same form as in Table 1. Then we can prove that proofs in
〈L˜, ˜`〉 can be transformed so as to have cuts only against axioms, as in [14,
p. 97]. But this proves conservativity of L˜ over L′, since the axioms are all
in L′. We now define an interpretation of L@ in L˜: it will be the identity on
L, and will interpret @ by @˜. The rest of the proof is exactly the same as for
Proposition 1.
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2.2 The Structure of the Canonical Model
We can now apply our cut elimination result to elucidate the McCain-Turner
definitions; we recall the definition, (1), of the operation MΞ, from models to
sets of sentences. The key result here is
Lemma 1. If we have
A ` @P
in the sequent calculus, with A and p non modal, then there is a finite set
I = {φi1 ∧ . . . ∧ φiki}i∈I
of conjunctions of rule bodies such that, for each i ∈ I, the corresponding rule
heads entail p, i.e.
ψi1 , . . . , ψiki ` P,
and such that
A ` I.
Proof. The proof is by an induction on the structure of cut-free proofs: because
we may apply weakening or contraction to the occurrence of @P on the right,
the inductive hypothesis will be:
If we have
Γ ` Γ′, (@P )n
in the sequent calculus, with n ≥ 0, then there is a set
I = {φi1 ∧ . . . ∧ φiki}i∈I
of conjunctions of rule bodies such that, for each i ∈ I, the corre-
sponding rule heads entail p, i.e.
ψi1 , . . . , ψiki ` P,
and such that
Γ ` Γ′, I.
The single-premise rules are trivial: the other cases are as follows. We will
tacitly assume, in this proof, that, whenever we have a conjunction φ1, . . . , φk,
that the φi are all instantiations of rule bodies, and that their heads satisfy
ψ1, . . . , ψk ` p. The letters I, J, . . . will be understood to refer to sets of such
conjunctions of rule bodies.
∨L We start with
Γ1, A ` Γ2, (@P )m Γ3, B ` Γ4, (@P )n ∨L
Γ1,Γ3, A ∨B ` Γ2,Γ4, (@P )m+n
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We prove the inductive hypothesis for the conclusion as follows:
Π···
Γ1, A ` Γ2, I
Π′···
Γ3, B ` Γ4, J
Γ1,Γ3, A ∨B ` Γ2,Γ4, I, J
where Π and Π′ are the proofs given by the inductive hypothesis.
∧R and → L are similar.
@R We have
Γ ` Γ′, φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φk, (@P )n @R
Γ ` Γ′, (@P )n+1
The next stage of the induction is as follows:
···
Γ ` Γ′, φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φk, I
structural rules
Γ ` Γ′, I ∪ {φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φk}
Axiom We have
Axiom
Γ, X ` X,Γ′, (@P )n
and this immediately gives us the base case of the induction, with I = ∅.
⊥ L and >R are similar.
Lemma 2. Let Ξ be a causal theory, and let M be a model of the non-modal
language: let M be the set of (non-modal) sentences true in M . Then
MΞ = {Q|Q nonmodal, and M ` @Q} (4)
where (·) is closure under the non-modal inference rules, and ` on the right is
modal entailment.
Proof. We prove the right-to-left containment of (4) first. Suppose that we have
a proof of M ` @Q; we can assume we have a cut-free proof of
P1, . . . , Pk ` @Q
with the Pi true in M . (Note that, since the right rule for @ is finitary, we
can assume that the antecedent of this sequent is finite.) Then, by the previous
lemma, there is a finite set I of conjunctions of rule bodies such that
P1, . . . , Pk ` I
and such that all of the corresponding conjunctions of rule heads entail Q.
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Because all of the Pi are true in M , at least one of the elements of I must
be true in M : consequently, we have φ1, . . . , φk, all true in M , such that
ψ1, . . . , ψk ` Q
Hence Q ∈MΞ, and this proves the right-to-left inclusion.
The left-to-right direction of (4) is proved as follows. The right hand side is
clearly deductively closed, so we only need to show that
MΞ ⊆ {Q|Q nonmodal, and I ` @Q}
So suppose that we have an element ψ of MΞ: we have instantiations of causal
rules with head ψ and body φ, and φ is true in I (that is, φ ∈M). So we have
a proof:
Ax
φ ` φ @R
φ ` @ψ
So, consequently, ψ is a member of the right hand side.
Proposition 3. L@ is a definitional extension of L: more precisely, for any
modelM of L, ifM is the set of propositions true inM , and for any proposition




Proof. We prove this by induction on the modal complexity of Q: it is clearly
true for Q unmodalised, since M is a model of L, and since ` coincides with `@
on L. For the inductive step, we have to show that, for any @R, we either have
M ` @R or M ` ¬ @R. So,
M 0 ¬ @R
iff M,@R 0⊥
iff M, φ1 ∧ . . . φk 0⊥ for some φ1, . . . , φk
with ψ1, . . . , ψk ` R
iff M ` φ1 ∧ . . . φk sinceM is a model
iff M ` @R.
Theorem 2. The canonical model of L@ has the following structure: the worlds
are all the models of L, and the accessibility relation ρ is given by
IρJ iff J is a model of IΞ
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Proof. By definition, the worlds of the canonical model are simply the maximal
consistent subsets of L@: because L@ is a definitional extension of L, these are
the same as maximal consistent subsets (i.e. models) of L. Lemma (4) gives the
accessibility relation.
Lemma 3. Let I be a model of the non-modal language: then I is the only
model of IΞ iff I ` (@P → P ) ∧ (P → @P ), for all non-modal P .
Proof. I is the only model of IΞ iff
I = IΞ
= {Q|Q nonmodal, and I ` @Q}
So I ⊆ IΞ iff
I ` @Q if I  Q,
which is equivalent to
I ` @Q if I ` Q,
and IΞ ⊆ I iff
I  Q if I ` @Q
which is similarly equivalent to
I ` Q if I ` @Q
Now, for any non-modal Q, we have I ` Q or I ` ¬Q; so, finally, we have
that I is the only model of IΞ iff
I ` @Q→ Q ∧Q→ @Q
for any non-modal Q.
This allows us to prove
Theorem 3. Given a McCain-Turner causal theory Ξ, a non-modal proposition
P is causally explained according to Ξ if, in the corresponding modal logic, we
have
{X1 ↔ @X1}i∈I ` P (5)
for some set of non-modal propositions Xi.
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{I|I a causally explained model};
but, by the previous lemma,⋂
{I|I a causally explained model} = {P ↔ @P |P non-modal}
The result follows.
This allows us a more intuitive description of the concept of a causally ex-
plained model. For a proposition P , @P is true in a model if we have an expla-
nation of P , true in that model: so, for a model to be causally explained, two
things must hold. Firstly, every proposition true in the model must have an ex-
planation, true in that model; secondly, every proposition with an explanation,
true in the model, must itself be true in the model.
3 Explanation and Argument
Parsons and Jennings ([8]; see also [9]) have described a consequence relation,
`ACR, which is intended to capture the practice of argumentation. The items
which this system manipulates are ordered pairs (p,A), where p is a proposition
and A a set of propositions: we will call such a pair an argument. Intuitively, p
is the conclusion of an argument, and A is the set of its grounds. We will also
call p the head of the argument, and A its body.
The system is given in Table 2: here Ξ is a set of basic arguments. Parsons
and Jennings write their system in natural deduction style, with introduction
and elimination rules, using sequents of the form Ξ `ACR (p,A): such a sequent
says that A is an argument for p, given basic arguments Ξ.
(Note that we have interchanged the labels on the rules ¬I and RAA: Parsons
and Jennings’ original labelling is clearly a typo of some sort.)
We can now translate Parsons and Jennings’ system into ours.
Definition 1. Let Ξ`ACR (p,A) be a sequent in Parsons and Jennings’ system.
Its modal translation is the sequent
A ` @ΞP,





∣∣ (p,A) ∈ Ξ} .
Since the Parsons and Jennings system is written in natural deduction style,
some of the rules (for example → I) manipulate the set of basic arguments:
consequently, the modal operator in the modal translation will vary. We will,
then, need the following lemma:
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Lemma 4. If @Ξ is the modality associated to a set Ξ of explanations, and if@Ξ∪{(ψ,φ)} is that associated to Ξ ∪ {(ψ, φ)}, then we have
@Ξ∪{(ψ,φ)}p ∼= (φ ∧ @Ξ(ψ → p)) ∨ @p
for any p.
Proof. This follows easily using Proposition 1: we show that operator on the
right hand side (i.e. φ∧@Ξ(ψ → ·)∨@·) is a K modality, and satisfies the same
minimality property as @Ξ. The two are, consequently, equivalent.
We have the following
Proposition 4. The modal interpretation is sound: that is, each of Parsons




and this follows from our definition of the modal translation.
∧–I, ¬–E, →–E ∧ − I, for example, is
Ξ `ACR (p,A) Ξ `ACR (q,B)
Ξ `ACR (p ∧ q, A ∪B)
and this follows from the K tautology @p∧@q ` @p∧ q. ¬−E and → −E
are similar.
∧–E1, ∧–E2, ∨-I1, ∨-I2, EFQ ∧ − E1, for example, is
Ξ `ACR (p ∧ q, A)
Ξ `ACR (p,A)
and this follows from the K tautology ` @(a ∧ b) → @a. ∧ − E2, ∨ − I1,
∨I2, and EFQ are similar.




Ξ `ACR (p ∨ q, A) Ξ, (p,A) `ACR (r,B) Ξ, (q, A) `ACR (r, C)
Ξ `ACR (r,B ∪ C)
and this corresponds, in our system, to
A→ @Ξ(p ∨ q), B → @Ξ∪{(p,A)}r, C → @Ξ∪{(q,A)}r
` B ∧ C → @Ξr
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We can use the lemma to express @Ξ∪{(p,A)} and @Ξ∪{(q,A)} in terms of@Ξ; some routine but tedious computation then reduces this case to
@Ξ(p ∨ q),@Ξ(p→ r),@Ξ(q → r) ` @Ξr (6)
which is a K tautology.
RAA, ¬–I ¬–I is
Ξ, (p, ∅) `ACR (⊥, A)
Ξ `ACR (¬p,A)
which corresponds to
A→ @Ξ∪{(p,∅)} ⊥` A→ @Ξ¬p;
using the lemma on @Ξ∪{(p,∅)}, and some computation, reduces this to
@ ⊥ ∨ @ (p→⊥) ` @¬p
which is a K tautology. ¬–I is similar.
→–I This is
Ξ, (p, ∅) `ACR (q, A)
Ξ `ACR (p→ q, A)
which corresponds to
A→ @Ξ∪{(p,∅)}q ` A→ @Ξ(p→ q).
The usual moves reduce this to
@q ∨ @(p→ q) ` @(p→ q)
again a K tautology.
Completeness does not hold. This is for trivial reasons: all rules (except ∨E)
of the Parsons and Jennings system leave the body of the argument intact. A
trivial induction on the length of proofs will yield
Proposition 5. In any proof of
Ξ `ACR (p,A),
A must be a union of the bodies of rules in Ξ.
Since the modal sequent calculus certainly does not satisfy this condition,
we cannot hope for completeness. What we need to do is to be able to compose
proofs in the Parsons and Jennings system with natural deduction proofs for
the grounds of an argument: we could, theoretically, write down another set of
rules for doing this. However, we only need one extra rule, which is this:
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Definition 2. Let classical ∨E be the following rule:
A ` q ∨ r Ξ `ACR (r,B ∪ {q}) Ξ `ACR (r, C ∪ {r}) ∨EC
Ξ `ACR (r,A ∪ P ∪ C)
where A ` q ∨ r is an entailment in classical natural deduction.
We clearly have
Proposition 6. The modal translation is sound for classical or-elimination.
And we can also prove completeness:
Theorem 4. The modal translation is complete: that is, given a proof of
A ` @Ξp, (7)
there is a proof, in the Parsons and Jennings system together with classical
or-elimination, of
Ξ `ACR (p,A) (8)
Sketch of proof. We establish the following lemma:
Lemma 5. If p is non-modal, given a sequent calculus proof of
ψ1, . . . , ψk ` p,
then there is a Parsons and Jennings proof of
Ξ ` (p, {φ1, . . . , φk}).
This lemma can be proved by first transforming the sequent calculus proof
to a natural deduction proof, and then observing that the Parsons and Jennings
rules mirror the rules of classical natural deduction.
So now we can prove the theorem: we take a proof of A ` @Ξp, and from it




φi1 ∧ . . . ∧ φiki (9)
Ξ `ACR (p, {φi1 , . . . , φiki}) for any i (10)
We then use classical or-elimination in order to glue together (9) and (10).
Remark 2. As we see here, the natural deduction formulation is actually quite
ambiguous as to what its premises are: in a proof of
Ξ `ACR (p,A),
are the premises the basic arguments Ξ, or the grounds A for the argument
which is to be established? Now the system is set up as if the premises are the
set Ξ of basic arguments, and this gives a sense of composition of arguments
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which is valid: that is, from Ξ `ACR (p,A) and Ξ′, (p,A) `ACR (q,B), we can
establish Ξ′,Ξ `ACR (q,B). But this is not enough: we also want to regard the
grounds of arguments as premises.
The situation is clearly two-dimensional in something like Pratt’s sense –
he defines the dimension of a logic to be “the smallest number of variables
and constants of the logic sufficient to determine the remaining variables and
constants” [12]: the modal operator can be varied quite independently of the
classical connectives, merely by altering the set of causal rules. Consequently,
a formalism such as Masini’s [5] [6] may well be more appropriate.
Remark 3. This translation between sequent calculus and the Parsons and
Jennings natural deduction is, in addition, not very sensitive to the structure
of proofs on either side: natural deduction proofs tend to transform the conclu-
sion of the argument quite extensively before coming down to basic arguments.
Sequent calculus proofs, by contrast, leave the conclusion unchanged until an
application of @R, after which the proof is a matter of standard classical logic.
In addition, the Parsons and Jennings system only represents a fragment of the
full sequent calculus (namely, the entailments in which @ only occurs on the
right). A natural deduction formulation of the entire sequent calculus would be
interesting, but would have to extend the Parsons and Jennings system quite
considerably.
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Ξ `ACR (>, ∅)
Ξ `ACR (p,A) Ξ `ACR (q,B) ∧I
Ξ `ACR (p ∧ q, A ∪B)
Ξ `ACR (p ∧ q, A) ∧E1
Ξ `ACR (p,A)
Ξ `ACR (p ∧ q, A) ∧E2
Ξ `ACR (q, A)
Ξ `ACR (p,A) ∨I1
Ξ `ACR (p ∨ q, A)
Ξ `ACR (q, A) ∨I2
Ξ `ACR (p ∨ q, A)
Ξ `ACR (p ∨ q, A)
Ξ, (p,A) `ACR (r,B)
Ξ, (q, A) `ACR (r, C) ∨E
Ξ `ACR (r,B ∪ C)
Ξ, (p, ∅) `ACR (⊥, A) ¬I
Ξ `ACR (¬p,A)
Ξ `ACR (p,A) Ξ `ACR (¬p,A) ¬E
Ξ `ACR (⊥, A)
Ξ, (p, ∅) `ACR (q, A) → I
Ξ `ACR (p→ q, A)
Ξ `ACR (p,A) Ξ `ACR (p→ q,B) → E
Ξ `ACR (q, A ∪B)
Ξ `ACR (⊥, A)
EFQ
Ξ `ACR (p,A)
Ξ, (¬p, ∅) `ACR (⊥, A)
RAA
Ξ `ACR (p,A)
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